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Changing social preferences and optimal
redistributive taxation
By Jang-Ting Guo a and Alan Krause b
a Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA;
e-mail: guojt@ucr.edu
b Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington,
YO10 5DD, UK; e-mail: alan.krause@york.ac.uk
We examine a dynamic model of optimal nonlinear taxation
of labour income and savings, in which there are two politi-
cal parties: left-wing and right-wing. The parties di¤er only in
their redistributive preferences, with the left-wing party having
a stronger preference for redistribution. Our analysis explicitly
considers the possibility that societys preference for redistrib-
ution may change, as reected in its future voting behaviour.
The incumbent government respects the possibility that soci-
etys preference may change, and sets taxes to maximize ex-
pected social welfare. Our main result is that an incumbent
left-wing (resp. right-wing) government will implement a re-
gressive (resp. progressive) savings tax policy. The incumbent
government implements this policy not out of self interest, but
to accommodate the redistributive goals of the opposing party.
JEL classications: H21, H24.
1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the following observations: an incumbent government may
choose to set taxes based only on its own preference for redistribution, since it has
after-all been elected and in that sense its preference for redistribution is supported by
society. Therefore, the incumbent government might argue, with some justication, that
it has a mandate to implement its preferred policies. However, tax policies implemented
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today will a¤ect outcomes in the future, and it is possible that societys preference for
redistribution may change, i.e., the incumbent government might not be re-elected. Ac-
cordingly, one could argue that when setting taxes the incumbent government should
take into account the possibility that societys preference may change. We believe this
latter approach is consistent with the notion of optimal taxation, which is normative in
nature in that it is concerned with how the government should set taxes. In particular,
the optimal tax literature typically assumes that the government should implement the
tax system that is most preferred by society (i.e., that which maximizes social welfare).
This implies that if societys preferences change, the tax system should correspondingly
change as well. Our aim is to investigate optimal taxation when the incumbent govern-
ment respects the possibility that societys preference for redistribution may change.
Our paper is also motivated by the observation that previous studies have not con-
sidered how an incumbent government, who recognizes that it may not be in power in
the future, should set policies to maximize social welfare (without trying to inuence
its re-election chances). Instead, the political-economy literature has focused mostly on
the positive question of how the incumbent may set policies to undermine future oppos-
ing governments. For example, Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini
(1990) nd that governments may use public debt strategically to bind the hands of
future governments. Similarly, Aghion and Bolton (1990) show how an incumbent gov-
ernment can set policy to raise its chances of re-election. Such policy setting may be
optimal from the governments own point of view, but it is not necessarily optimal from
societys point of view. A key distinction between our paper and the aforementioned
literature is that the incumbent government in our model sets policies to accommodate
(rather than undermine) the opposing partys preferences, reecting the possibility that
the opposition may be in power in the future. As a result, while the incumbent gov-
ernments behaviour is strategic in both settings, there exists an importance di¤erence
in terms of the underlying policy objective. In addition, the relationship between our
paper and that by Zoutman, et al. (2016) is interesting, since the aim of their paper
is in some sense the reverse of ours. Zoutman, et al. (2016) start with the proposed
tax policies announced by the major political parties in the Netherlands, and then use
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these proposals to infer the redistributive preferences of each political party. However,
as their focus is not on policy recommendations, their analysis remains more positive
than normative.
We consider a dynamic model in which there are two political parties, left-wing
and right-wing, that are distinguished only by their preferences for redistribution from
high-skill to low-skill individuals. The left-wing party has a stronger preference for
redistribution than the right-wing party. The model economy has two periods, which
can be interpreted as representing the present versus the future. In period 1 there
is some probability that the incumbent government (which is either the left-wing or
right-wing party) will be re-elected in period 2. In our model, this is equivalent to
there being some probability that societys preference for redistribution may change.
In period 1, the incumbent government implements optimal nonlinear (Mirrlees 1971
style) taxation on labour income and savings, while in period 2 the elected government
implements optimal nonlinear taxation on labour income. As period 2 is the last period,
there are no savings undertaken in that period. Our assumption that the government
can implement fully-general nonlinear taxation reects the normative nature of taxation
in our model.1
Our main result is that an incumbent left-wing government should implement a re-
gressive savings taxation policy, in that low-skill individuals face a positive marginal
tax rate on their savings, whereas high-skill individuals face a negative marginal tax
rate. An incumbent right-wing government should do the opposite, i.e., it implements
progressive savings taxation: low-skill individuals face a negative marginal savings tax
rate, while that for high-skill individuals is positive.2 The intuition, explained in fur-
ther detail below, follows from each government types desire to shift the individuals
consumption between periods, in response to the possibility that it may not be in power
1By contrast, positive analyses of taxation often consider restrictions on the tax instruments that
the government can implement, say due to political constraints.
2It should be kept in mind that using the terms regressive and progressive to describe the pattern of
marginal tax rates is somewhat loose language, because such pattern does not necessarily align with the
direction of redistribution. Nevertheless, we use the regressive/progressive terminology for convenience
and because similar terminology has been used in the literature on nonlinear capital taxation (e.g.,
Farhi, et al. 2012).
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in period 2. Importantly, however, this consumption shifting is not undertaken by the
incumbent government out of self interest; it is done to accommodate the redistributive
goals of the opposing party. Indeed, in the absence of such accommodation, the Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976) result that savings should not be taxed alongside nonlinear income
taxation would apply.
There is a literature that examines optimal taxation when individuals have di¤erent
preferences (e.g., Diamond and Spinnewijn 2011, Golosov, et al. 2013, and Krause 2014),
and when the governments preferences di¤er from those of individuals (e.g., Racionero
2001, Blomquist and Micheletto 2006, and ODonoghue and Rabin 2006). But to the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to consider the possibility that societys
preference for redistribution may change over time. The literature on the comparative
statics of optimal nonlinear income taxes (e.g., Weymark 1987 and Simula 2010) has
examined the e¤ects of changing the weights in the social welfare function, but their
models are static so there are no savings. Our paper is also related to the extensive
literature on the optimal taxation of capital/savings (which we discuss in Section 5). The
canonical result is that capital should not be taxed. Our paper, however, contributes
to the literature which identies exceptions to that rule, by providing a new rationale
for taxing/subsidizing savings. More recently, Scheuer and Wolitzky (2016) examine
sustainable capital taxation, in that a tax policy is sustainable if it garners su¢cient
support in the future to prevent a reform. Their focus is therefore on the ability of the
government to commit, with policy designed to deter the gathering of popular support
for reform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main
features of our model, while Section 3 describes how optimal taxation is implemented.
Section 4 presents our results, while Section 5 discusses our results in the context of the
literature on tax theory versus tax practice. Section 6 concludes, and some mathemat-




There is a unit measure of individuals, with a proportion  2 (0; 1) being high-skill
workers and (1  ) being low-skill workers. Type 1 individuals are low-skill and type 2
individuals are high-skill, with w1 and w2 (0 < w1 < w2) denoting the wages of low-skill
and high-skill individuals respectively. There are two political parties, left-wing (denoted
L) and right-wing (denoted R), who di¤er only in their preference for redistribution from
high-skill to low-skill individuals, with the left-wing party having a stronger preference.
The economy lasts for two periods, which can be thought of as the present versus the
future.3 In period 1 there is an incumbent government, which is either the left-wing or
right-wing party. The probability that the incumbent government, party i (i = L or R),
is re-elected in period 2 is pi 2 (0; 1), implying that (1  pi) is the probability that the
opposing party is elected. This probability is completely exogenous, i.e., the incumbent
government cannot a¤ect its chances of re-election.
While the assumption that the incumbent government cannot a¤ect its re-election
probability makes the analysis easier, we hasten to stress that we do not make the
assumption for that reason. The key feature of our paper is that the analysis is purely
normative. That is, the incumbent government respects the possibility that societys
preferences may change (i.e., it may not be re-elected), and takes this into account by
setting taxes to maximize expected social welfare. Accordingly, even if the incumbent
government could a¤ect its re-election chances, it should not take action to increase
(or for that matter decrease) its re-election probability. The assumption that the re-
election probability is exogenous is consistent with our normative approach, in which we
seek to determine how the government should set taxes. Alternatively, if the aim were
to explain how governments actually set taxes (positive economics), then attempts by
the incumbent government to inuence its re-election probability would become directly
relevant.
All individuals have the same preferences, which can be represented by the utility
3As a practical matter, assuming a nite time horizon is convenient because it will be seen that the












where c1ki and l
1
ki are, respectively, type k s (k = 1 or 2) consumption and labour in
period 1 when party i (i = L or R) is in government. Analogously, c2kj and l
2
kj are type
k s consumption and labour in period 2 when party j (j = L or R) is in government. The
function u() is increasing and strictly concave, v() is increasing and strictly convex, and
 2 (0; 1] is the individuals discount factor. Individuals may save in period 1, denoted
s1ki, which raises their consumption in period 2 by (1 + r)s
1
ki, where r > 0 is the market
interest rate. For future reference, we use mtki to denote type k s post-tax income in
period t when party i is in government, and ytki to denote type k s pre-tax income in




As our model is dynamic, the question arises as to whether the incumbent government
can implement what Gaube (2007) calls long-term versus short-term taxation. If the
incumbent government announces its tax systems for periods 1 and 2, and if re-elected in
period 2 it simply implements the tax system it promised in period 1, then the incumbent
government can commit to long-term taxation. On the other hand, if the incumbent
government is re-elected and it implements a tax system in period 2 independent of any
announcements made in period 1, then it is using short-term taxation. That is, the re-
elected government sets taxes in period 2 in the same manner as the opposing party will if
it is elected. Since long-term or short-term taxation may be practised, we examine both
systems. Under both systems we assume full commitment by the government, in the
sense that the government in period 2 does not take advantage of skill-type information
revealed in period 1 nor re-optimize the savings tax. This is because, to the extent
possible, we want the government in period 2 to implement taxation under the same
constraints as the government in period 1, so that our results are driven only by the
possibility of a change in societys redistributive preferences.
3.1 Long-term Taxation
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As the optimal tax problem is solved by backward induction, we rst describe the nature
of optimal taxation in period 2. Suppose party i (i = L orR) was in government in period
1, but the opposing party j 6= i (j = L or R) is in government in period 2. It implements





2ji for the low-skill and high-skill individuals, respectively, to maximize:
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where equation (3.1) is a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, with j 2 (0; 1)
representing the weight that party j places on the welfare of low-skill individuals. It is
assumed that L > R, to capture the assumption that the left-wing party has a stronger





i.e., type k s second-period consumption equals their second-period post-tax income plus
the return on savings undertaken in period 1 when party i was in government. Equation
(3.2) is the governments budget constraint, where s1i denotes savings by the govern-
ment in period 1. For simplicity we assume that the governments revenue requirement
is zero, so taxation is implemented only for redistributive purposes.4 Equation (3.3)
is the high-skill types incentive-compatibility constraint.5 At this point an interesting
issue arises regarding the information available to the government in period 2. Based
on the individuals responses to taxation in period 1, the government in period 2 can
4While it may be more realistic to assume that a left-wing government has a higher revenue require-
ment than a right-wing government, we would like to compare their tax policies on the same basis.
Accordingly, we assume that both parties have the same revenue requirement, and for simplicity this
revenue requirement is set to zero.
5Although we assume that a left-wing government has a stronger preference for redistribution than
a right-wing government, both still seek to redistribute from the high-skill to the low-skill. Accordingly,
under both governments high-skill individuals may want to mimic low-skill individuals, but not vice
versa. Therefore, only the high-skill types incentive-compatibility constraint will be binding. This is
what Stiglitz (1982) calls the normal case and what Guesnerie (1995) calls redistributive equilibria.
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distinguish high-skill from low-skill individuals, and therefore could use (rst-best) per-
sonalized lump-sum taxes and transfers. However, as mentioned earlier, we assume full
commitment by the government. Accordingly, the government in period 2 implements
nonlinear income taxation, rather than exploit skill-type information revealed in period
1 to implement rst-best taxation in the second period.6
The solution to the second-period optimal tax problem yields functions for the choice












2j(), as well as the value
function W 2j () which represents the level of social welfare attainable in period 2 when
party j is in government.
In period 1 the incumbent government, party i, can by assumption implement long-
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2i. The incumbent government considers the (exogenous) probability
that it will be re-elected, and can therefore implement its planned tax system in period
6Papers that relax the commitment assumption include Apps and Rees (2006), Brett and Weymark
(2008a), Krause (2009), Guo and Krause (2011, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b), and Berliant and Ledyard
(2014), among others.
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2; but also the probability that the opposing party will be elected in period 2, and
social welfare will be W 2j . Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are, respectively, the incumbent
governments rst- and second-period budget constraints. Equation (3.7) is the high-skill
types incentive-compatibility constraint, where:
V 22j() = u(m
2

































1ii, their expected utility from choos-
ing the former must be greater than or equal to their expected utility from choosing the









1ii in period 1, they must also choose the low-skill types tax treat-
ment in period 2 even if there is a change in government (cf. equation 3.9). This is
because the government in period 2 will know what choices the individuals made in
period 1. Therefore, all individuals must choose the same types tax treatment in period
2 as they did in period 1. To assume otherwise would e¤ectively allow individuals to
switch type in the eyes of the government, and would also enable a range of mimick-
ing strategies that would complicate the analysis without yielding much in additional
insight.
3.2 Short-term Taxation
If the incumbent government can only implement short-term taxation, then the govern-
ment in period 2, whether it be the re-elected incumbent or the opposing party, will
solve program (3:1)   (3:3) in period 2. In period 1 the incumbent government, party











































































where equation (3.10) is a weighted utilitarian social welfare function. The incumbent
government considers the (exogenous) probability that it will be re-elected, and therefore
can achieve a level of social welfare equal to W 2i in period 2, but also the probability
that the opposing party will be elected in period 2, and social welfare will be W 2j .
Equation (3.11) is the incumbent governments budget constraint, and equation (3.12)
is the high-skill types incentive-compatibility constraint, where:
V 22i() = u(m
2






























plus the utility they can then expect in period 2, piV
2
2i + (1  pi)V
2
2j, must be greater
than or equal to their expected utility from pretending to be low-skill.
4. Results
It is shown in the Appendix that the formula for the low-skill types marginal tax rate
applicable to savings (MTRS11i) under long-term taxation is:
MTRS11i =
(i   j)(1  pi)u
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where 1i > 0 is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint, equation (3.7).
The rst-term in equation (4.1) can be interpreted as the redistributive e¤ect, and
the second-term as the incentive e¤ect. Likewise, the formula for the high-skill types
marginal tax rate applicable to savings (MTRS12i) under long-term taxation is:
MTRS12i =
(j   i)(1  pi)u
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where 2j > 0 is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint, equation (3.3).
The rst-term in equation (4.2) is the redistributive e¤ect, while the second- and third-
terms are the incentive e¤ects.7
To interpret these formulas, consider rst redistributive taxation in a static setting.
In a rst-best static setting, low-skill individuals receive more utility and more con-
sumption under a left-wing government than under a right-wing government.8 In a
second-best (incentive-compatible) static setting, however, low-skill individuals receive
more utility but less consumption under a left-wing government than under a right-wing
government (discussed further below). Therefore, absence any incentive e¤ects, in a dy-
namic setting an incumbent left-wing government that knows there is some chance it
will not be re-elected will want to bring forward consumption by low-skill individuals
and delay consumption by high-skill individuals. This would immediately imply that
an incumbent left-wing government will want to tax (resp. subsidize) the savings of
low-skill (resp. high-skill) individuals at the margin. (The reverse argument holds for
an incumbent right-wing government.) These motives are represented by the rst terms
7As shown in the Appendix, the formulas for the marginal tax rates applicable to savings under
short-term taxation are very similar to those under long-term taxation, and their interpretations are
identical.
8By comparison, recall that under pure utilitarianism, rst-best taxation gives all types the same
level of consumption, but lower-skill individuals obtain more utility due to less labour supply.
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in equations (4.1) and (4.2). However, such consumption shifting potentially creates
incentive problems, which are represented by the remaining terms in equations (4.1)
and (4.2). It can be seen that these terms depend upon the comparative statics of a
second-best optimal nonlinear income tax system. The literature on the comparative
statics of optimal nonlinear income taxes has found that analytical results are obtainable
only when the utility function is quasi-linear, and even then only with respect to certain
parameters.9 Accordingly, we do not attempt to derive analytical solutions, but instead
use numerical methods to obtain our results. To this end, we assume that the utility












where  > 0 is the individuals coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, and 1= > 0 is the
individuals labour supply elasticity. Based on Chetty (2006), we postulate that  = 1
which implies that u(ctki) = ln(c
t
ki). While empirical estimates of the labour supply
elasticity can vary considerably, based on Chetty, et al. (2011) we set  = 2 which
implies a labour supply elasticity of 0.5.
Across countries, approximately one-third of persons aged 25-64 years have attained
tertiary level education (OECD, 2014). We assume that tertiary educated individuals
are high-skill and the remainder are low-skill, i.e.,  = 1=3. We normalize the low-skill
types wage to unity and set the high-skill types wage equal to 1.6, which is based on
an estimated college wage premium of 60 % (see Fang 2006 and Goldin and Katz 2007).
Since there is no direct observation on the welfare weights, our benchmark parameter-
ization arbitrarily sets L = 0:52 and R = 0:48, so that the left-wing party is slightly
more redistributive than pure utilitarianism, while the right-wing party is slightly less.
In addition, the probability that the incumbent government is re-elected is arbitrarily
set at 0.5. We assume an annual market interest rate of 4 %, which is in line with
standard practice, but we take each period to be four years in length (which is roughly
the length of a term in government). Therefore, 1 + r = 1:17. Finally, we assume that
9See, for example, Weymark (1987), Brett and Weymark (2008b, 2011), and Simula (2010).
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the individuals discount factor, , is equal to 1=(1 + r). The baseline parameter values
are presented in Table 1.
Before proceeding to our results, in Table 2 we conrm that under pure utilitarianism
(L = R = 0:5) the optimal marginal tax rate applicable to type k s savings (denoted
MTRS1k) is zero. This result follows from Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), who show
that commodity taxation is redundant alongside nonlinear income taxation if labour is
separable from consumption in the utility function and all individuals have the same
preferences. We also obtain the standard results on the optimal marginal tax rate
applicable to type k s labour income in period t, denoted as MTRLtk  the optimal
marginal tax rate applicable to the high-skill types labour income is zero, while that for
low-skill individuals is positive.
4.1 Baseline Results
Tables 3 and 4 report the baseline results for long-term taxation and short-term taxa-
tion, respectively. As it turns out, the results are qualitatively the same in both cases.
Specically, the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to the labour income of type k in-
dividuals in period t under a i-wing government (denotedMTRLtki) are standard. That
is, the optimal marginal tax rate applicable to the high-skill types labour income is al-
ways zero, while that for low-skill individuals is always positive. What is more interesting
are the optimal tax treatments of savings (denoted MTRS1ki), which we summarize as
follows:
Result 1 If the incumbent party is left-wing, the low-skill individuals optimal marginal
tax rate on savings is positive (MTRS11L > 0) while that for high-skill individuals is
negative (MTRS12L < 0). If the incumbent party is right-wing, the low-skill individuals
optimal marginal tax rate on savings is negative (MTRS11R < 0) while that for high-skill
individuals is positive (MTRS12R > 0).
In sum, an incumbent left-wing government should set taxes to discourage savings by
low-skill individuals and subsidize savings by high-skill individuals, while an incumbent
right-wing government should do the opposite. The intuition underlying Result 1 follows
from an important but somewhat overlooked feature of redistributive taxation, in that
it redistributes utility, not income. As a left-wing government seeks to redistribute more
13
utility than a right-wing government, high-skill individuals have a stronger incentive
to mimic under left-wing governments. This is why low-skill individuals receive less
consumption, and face a higher marginal labour income tax rate, under a left-wing
government than under a right-wing government. To understand how this feature of
redistributive taxation helps explain Result 1, suppose the incumbent government is
right-wing. An incumbent right-wing government knows there is some probability that
the left-wing party will be in power in period 2, and that the left-wing party will need
to increase the di¤erence in the post-tax incomes of high-skill and low-skill individuals
to deter mimicking. By encouraging savings by low-skill individuals and discouraging
savings by high-skill individuals, the incumbent right-wing government is helping the left-
wing party in period 2, because the latter can raise the di¤erence in the two types post-
tax incomes without there being a corresponding increase in consumption discrepancy.
The cost of this savings tax policy is increased utility inequality in period 1, due to lower
consumption by low-skill individuals and higher consumption by high-skill individuals.
But since the incumbent government is right-wing, it is more willing to tolerate this
rise in inequality. A reverse argument applies if the incumbent government is left-wing.
An incumbent left-wing government knows there is some probability that the right-wing
party will be elected in period 2. As the right-wing party redistributes less, it has a
lower need to di¤erentiate the two types post-tax incomes. It is therefore in a better
position to inherit lower savings by low-skill individuals and higher savings by high-
skill individuals. Moreover, this savings pattern implies more consumption by low-skill
individuals and less consumption by high-skill individuals in period 1, which is more
preferable under a left-wing government because it reduces utility inequality.
4.2 Comparative Statics
Figures 1   3 show how the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to savings change
in response to changes in the parameters that are specic to our model: the social
welfare weights i and the probability that the incumbent government is re-elected
pi. The e¤ects of changes in these parameters are explored, whilst holding all other
parameters at their baseline levels. As the results for long-term and short-term taxation
are qualitatively the same, we present only the long-term taxation results. The main
14
ndings are summarized as follows:
Result 2 If the incumbent party is left-wing, @MTRS11L=@L > 0 and @MTRS
1
2L=@L <
0. If the incumbent party is right-wing, @MTRS11R=@L < 0 and @MTRS
1
2R=@L > 0.
Result 3 If the incumbent party is left-wing, @MTRS11L=@R < 0 and @MTRS
1
2L=@R >
0. If the incumbent party is right-wing, @MTRS11R=@R > 0 and @MTRS
1
2R=@R < 0.
Result 4 If the incumbent party is left-wing, @MTRS11L=@pL < 0 and @MTRS
1
2L=@pL >
0. If the incumbent party is right-wing, @MTRS11R=@pR > 0 and @MTRS
1
2R=@pR < 0.
The intuition underlying Results 2 4 is straightforward and follows that underlying
Result 1. An increase in L implies, ceteris paribus, a greater di¤erence in the redistrib-
utive preferences of left-wing and right-wing governments. Therefore, the di¤erences in
the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to the low-skill and high-skill types savings
are increased. Analogously, an increase in R reduces the di¤erence in the two partys
redistributive preferences; hence the di¤erences in the optimal marginal tax rates on
savings are reduced. An increase in the probability that the incumbent government is
re-elected reduces the di¤erences in the optimal marginal tax rates applicable to sav-
ings. If the incumbent government is more likely to be re-elected, it has less need to
implement marginal savings taxation/subsidization to accommodate the redistributive
goals of the opposition. In the limit, if the probability of re-election was certain, then
the Atkinson-Stiglitz result that savings should not be taxed would apply.
5. Discussion: Theory versus Practice of Taxation
We have shown that implementation of optimal nonlinear taxation by a left-wing (resp.
right-wing) government includes regressive (resp. progressive) savings taxation. It is
interesting to contrast this policy recommendation with both the theory and practice
of savings/capital taxation. In their review article on tax policy, Mankiw, et al. (2009)
note that the zero taxation of capital is a benchmark result and a prominent policy
recommendation. In particular, they highlight four key papers. First, the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) production e¢ciency theorem implies that intermediate goods should not
be taxed. To the extent that capital is an intermediate input in the production process,
15
the Diamond-Mirrlees result implies that capital should be exempt from taxation.10
Second, an implication of Atkinson and Stiglitzs (1976) analysis is that savings should
not be taxed (as discussed earlier). Third, there are the often-cited works of Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985), who conclude that the optimal long-run tax rate on capital is
zero within an optimal growth model. The models used and assumptions made in these
papers are quite distinct, thus contributing to the apparent robustness of the zero
capital tax policy recommendation.
In practice, capital is subject to signicant taxation. Mankiw, et al. (2009) report
corporate income tax rates averaging around 30 % in developed countries. These rates
have fallen sharply since the 1980s, but are still signicant. At the individual level, taxa-
tion of dividend income di¤ers substantially by country, but overall it remains signicant,
averaging near 20 % in OECD countries.
Given the above-mentioned gap between theory and practice, the question arises
as to whether theory is missing something or whether actual practice is simply sub-
optimal. In their article on linking basic research to policy recommendations, Diamond
and Saez (2011) argue strongly in favour of capital taxation. Their argument rests on
the observation that the assumptions driving the benchmark zero capital tax result are
not empirically relevant. In particular, they highlight that the Chamley-Judd model
assumes that individuals make rational savings decisions consistently over a very long
time horizon. Such behaviour is unsupported by empirical evidence. Likewise, the
Atkinson-Stiglitz result no longer holds if there is a positive correlation between skills
and savings propensity, which appears to be the case in reality.11 Since our paper
recommends non-zero savings taxation, it contributes to the literature that identies
exceptions to the baseline zero capital tax result (see, e.g., Conesa, et al. 2009 and
the references cited therein). However, we cannot claim (nor can the related literature)
that actual practice closely follows our policy recommendation. Table 5 shows corporate
10It is worth noting that Diamond and Saez (2011) disagree with this common interpretation of the
Diamond-Mirrlees result, stating that it does not imply that the capital income of households should
not be taxed.
11Diamond and Saez (2011) also argue in favour of capital taxation on the basis that: (i) it can be
di¢cult to distinguish between capital income and labour income, (ii) many individuals face borrowing
constraints, and (iii) uncertainty over future earnings.
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taxation as a share of total tax revenues under left-wing and right-wing governments
in three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.12 This tax-
share statistic is an indication of the emphasis placed on corporate versus other types
of taxation. Corporate income represents the return to capital and is predominately
earned by the rich. Therefore, loosely speaking, left-wing governments should be less
inclined to tax corporate income than right-wing governments if their objective is long-
term social welfare maximization. However, Table 5 shows that no clear pattern has
emerged. The corporate tax share is, on average, higher under left-wing governments in
the U.S., lower under left-wing governments in the U.K. (thus qualitatively consistent
with the theoretical predictions of our analysis), and there is no di¤erence under left-
wing and right-wing governments in Australia. One may wonder why actual practice
di¤ers in these countries. Perhaps political ideology plays a greater role in policy setting
in the U.S. than in the U.K., as compared to economic and social motives. Specically,
the Republican Party in the U.S. seeks to distinguish itself from the Democrats as the
low-tax and pro-business alternative; and actual practice in the U.S. appears to be
consistent with these di¤ering ideologies.
A similar discrepancy between recommended policy and actual practice arises re-
garding labour income taxation. Theory suggests that a decreasing pattern of marginal
labour tax rates may be optimal and consistent with redistribution (Mankiw, et al.
2009). Indeed, the workhorse Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal nonlinear income tax-
ation implies that the highest-skill worker should face a zero marginal tax rate.13 In
practice, marginal tax rates are increasing in income, with top rates averaging around
40 %.14 There again appears to be a large gap between theory and practice. Diamond
and Saez (2011), however, recommend that very high earnings should be subject to ris-
ing marginal tax rates. First, they emphasize that the zero marginal tax rate at the
12These countries are chosen as examples since their political systems have typically been dominated
by two parties that can loosely be described as left-wing and right-wing. These are the Democrats and
Republicans in the U.S., the Labour Party and Conservatives in the U.K., and the Labor Party and
Liberal Party in Australia.
13The top marginal tax rate may even be negative, if wages are endogenous. See Stiglitz (1982).
14In the U.K., for example, no tax is payable on the rst £11,000. Income from £11; 001 £43; 000
is taxed at 20 %, and income from £43; 001 £150; 000 is taxed at 40 %. All income above £150,000 is
taxed at 45 %.
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top result applies only to the highest-skill worker, suggesting that it is of little practical
relevance. Second, the pattern of optimal marginal tax rates is sensitive to the skill
distribution. If skills follow a Pareto distribution at the top, then high-earners should
face increasing marginal tax rates. Diamond and Saez (2011) argue that the Pareto
distribution better ts the data, as opposed to the log-normal distribution postulated
by Mankiw, et al. (2009). Nevertheless, there still appears to be a gap between theory
and practice away from the top of the skill distribution. For example, Diamond (1998)
and Saez (2001) nd that optimal marginal tax rates may follow a U-shaped pattern,
being high at both the top and bottom of the skill distribution, but relatively low in the
middle. Based on U.S. data, Saez (2001) shows that marginal tax rates should decrease
in income up to $75,000 per annum, before increasing up to $200,000; and then remain-
ing constant thereafter. However, if one moves beyond stated marginal tax rates to
incorporate the e¤ects of other policies (such as welfare programs), theory and practice
become much closer.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Research on tax policy from a normative perspective is ultimately concerned with making
recommendations as to how the government should set taxes. It is generally thought that
the government should implement the tax system that is most preferred by the society.
This corresponds to choosing the tax system that maximizes social welfare, assuming
that the social welfare function represents the societys preferences. As tax policies
implemented in the present can a¤ect outcomes in the future, and societys preferences
may change, it follows that the incumbent government should take the possibility of
such change into consideration when setting taxes.
In this paper, we have examined the case in which societys preference for redistrib-
ution may change. The incumbent government chooses the tax system that maximizes
expected social welfare, thereby explicitly respecting the possibility that societys pref-
erence may change. Our main result is that an incumbent left-wing government should
implement a regressive savings tax policy, while an incumbent right-wing government
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should do the opposite. The corresponding non-zero marginal tax rates on savings exist
only to accommodate the di¤erent redistributive goals of the opposing party. If there
was no chance that the opposing party may be elected  or equivalently no chance that
societys redistributive preference may change  the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) result
that savings should not be taxed alongside nonlinear income taxation would apply.
Finally, it seems reasonable to think that actual policy setting by an incumbent
government reects both self-interest and social welfare objectives. In future research,
it would be interesting to explore an extension of our model which incorporates some
self-interested behaviour (as in Persson and Svensson 1989 and Alesina and Tabellini
1990), and see whether such an extension can better explain the stylized facts shown in
Table 5.
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In order to derive expressions for the marginal tax rates, we rst describe how individuals




























The solution to program (A.1)  (A.3) yields the marginal conditions:
v0(ltk)
u0(ctk)wk




In the presence of taxation, the marginal conditions in equation (A.4) may not hold.








where MTRLtk denotes the marginal tax rate on labour faced by type k individuals
in period t, and MTRS1k denotes the marginal tax rate on savings faced by type k
individuals in period 1. However, since the government in each period may be left-wing
or right-wing, and it is not known in period 1 which party will be in power in period 2,








where E(u0(c2k)) = piu
0(c2ki) + (1   pi)u
0(c2kj) is type k s expected marginal utility of
consumption in period 2.
Marginal Savings Tax Rate Formulas under Long-term Taxation
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To derive equations (4.1) and (4.2), the rst-order conditions for program (3:4)  (3:7)
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where 2j > 0 is the multiplier on equation (3.3). Using equation (A.6), equations
(A:7)  (A:10) can be manipulated to yield equations (4.1) and (4.2).
Marginal Savings Tax Rate Formulas under Short-term Taxation
The formula for the low-skill types marginal tax rate applicable to savings under short-
term taxation is:
MTRS11i =
(i   j)(1  pi)u
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while that for the high-skill type is:
MTRS12i =
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 0.520                    σ 1.000 1w 1.000
R
 0.480                  γ 2.000 2w 1.600
i
p 0.500 1 + r 1.170
                    φ 0.333                  δ 0.855
TABLE 2
Pure Utilitarianism ( 0.5
L R
   )
Long-term Taxation Short-term Taxation








































Baseline Results: Long-term Taxation
Left-Wing Incumbent Right-Wing Incumbent

















































Baseline Results: Short-term Taxation
Left-Wing Incumbent Right-Wing Incumbent


















































Long-term Taxation: effects of changing
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Long-term Taxation: effects of changing
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TABLE 5
Corporate Taxation as a Share of Total Tax Revenues under Left-wing and Right-wing Governments
*
United States
Year 1965-68 1968-76 1976-80 1980-92 1992-2000 2000-08 2008-15
Government L R L R L R L
Corporate tax share (%) 16.3 12.3 11.5 8.0 8.6 8.3 7.6
Average L 11.0 Average R 9.5
United Kingdom
Year 1965-70 1970-74 1974-79 1979-97 1997-2010 2010-15
Government L R L R L R
Corporate tax share (%) 6.6 8.2 6.9 9.5 9.4 8.0
Average L 7.6 Average R 8.6
Australia
Year 1965-69 1969-75 1975-83 1983-90 1990-93 1993-96 1996-98 1998-2001 2001-07 2007-13 2013-14
Government R L R L R L R L R L R
Corporate tax share (%) 15.4 15.0 11.1 10.6 13.9 14.2 14.7 16.3 18.6 19.7 17.4
Average L 15.2 Average R 15.2
* Source: OECD (2016).
